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FACT SUMMARY 
Following this Court's ruling and remand in Mason v. 
Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 705 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1985), Mason 
submitted a proposed Judgment to the trial court awarding 
principal of $15f380 and judgment interest of $6,789.86. 
(Addendum to Appellant's Brief, hereafter "Add.,11 pp. 8-9.) 
Mason calculated the interest at the judgment rate of 12 percent 
from October 14, 1982, the date of the original judgment for 
Western, to January 31, 1986, the date of the current judgment 
for Mason. Mason did not reguest prejudgment interest. Over 
Western's objections, the trial court entered judgment in the 
precise amounts reguested by Mason. 
Western appealed both the damage calculation and the 
award of interest. (R. 192.) Mason did not file a notice of 
cross-appeal. Following motions for summary disposition, this 
Court affirmed the principal portion of the Judgment but refused 
to rule summarily on the issue of judgment interest. The Court 
expressly ruled that this appeal "is limited to the issue of 
whether the trial court properly allowed interest from the date 
of the entry of the previous judgment." (Add. 10.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff-respondent Cleo B. Mason improperly attempts 
to expand this appeal beyond the single issue as framed by the 
Court in its Summary Disposition Order of July 30, 1986. Mason 
attempts to modify and augment the trial court's judgment to 
include over $5f000 of prejudgment interest. However, this Court 
has no jurisdiction or right to address that new issue because 
Mason raises it for the first time on appeal, and Mason may not 
seek to modify the judgment to enlarge her rights thereunder 
without having filed a cross-appeal. 
Under the general rule, as discussed and documented in 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-12, Mason may receive judgment interest 
only from the entry of her 1986 judgment, not from the date of 
Western's 1982 judgment. Authorities cited by Mason to the 
contrary are either distinguishable or represent the guestionable 
minority rule and are therefore not persuasive authority on this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: MASON, AS RESPONDENT, MAY NOT SEEK TO MODIFY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT TO OBTAIN PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
BECAUSE MASON FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL 
COURT AND FAILED TO FILE A CROSS-APPEAL. 
Mason argues for the first time on appeal that she is 
entitled to prejudgment interest from the supposed date of her 
-2-
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loss in 1977. Mason seeks not only the $6,789.86 of judgment 
interest awarded by the trial court, but now attempts to modify 
and expand that judgment to obtain, in addition, more than $5,000 
of prejudgment interest. (Resp. Brief, pp. 5-9.) Thus, Mason now 
claims a total of almost $12,000 of interest. However, Mason is 
precluded from raising the prejudgment interest issue on this 
appeal because she failed to present the issue in the trial court 
and did not file a notice of cross-apoeal. 
Hardly any rule is more firmly established in this 
Court's practice than the rule that issues cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. E.g., Insley Manufacturing Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986)? Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) (issues not presented to 
trial court are not reviewable by this Court). In the present 
case, Mason never reguested from the trial court the more than 
$5,000 in prejudgment interest, measured from the supposed date 
of loss in 1977, now claimed on appeal. Mason reguested in her 
Mason is uncertain of the total. In three places she 
lists the total as $10,904.21, Resp. Brief pp. 5, 7, 9, 
while in two other places she claims the total is 
$11,918.87, Resp. Brief pp. 9 n.l, 13. Of course, both 
estimates far exceed the $6,789.86 of interest Mason 
reguested from the trial court originally. Clearly, Mason1s 
claimed loss is not calculable with the degree of 
mathematical accuracy that she asserts. 
-3-
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proposed judgment only the $6r789.86 of judqment interest, 
calculated from the date of Western's 1982 judgment. Thus, the 
trial court awarded Mason the precise amount of interest 
requested, and Mason made no objection to that award. Because 
Mason made no request for prejudgment interest in the trial 
court, she may not assert the request for the first time on this 
appeal. 
Mason, as respondent on this appeal, is also precluded 
from enlarging her interest award for the reason that she failed 
to file a notice of cross-appeal. Utah law is clear that if a 
respondent on appeal wishes to attack or alter the judgment to 
enlarge his own rights or to lessen the rights of his adversary 
thereunder, such as to increase the amount awarded, he must 
timely file a notice of cross-appeal. Absent a notice of cross-
appeal, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the respondent's 
claims. Utah Rules of App. Proc. 4(d) (see also Advisory 
Committee Note). For example, in the leading case of Terry v. 
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1980), the Court held that the plaintiffs-respondents could not 
increase their punitive damage award because they had failed to 
cross-appeal on that issue. Similarly, in Bentley v. Potter, 694 
P.2d 617, 622 (Utah 1984), the Court held that the respondents 
could not modify the judgment to increase their damages because 
-4-
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they failed to file a cross-appeal. See also Labrum v. 
Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985); Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287r 292 (Utah 1984) ; Cerritos 
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 
1982). 
Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord and 
specifically hold that a respondent may not modify the judgment 
to enlarge the award of interest in the absence of a cross-appeal 
validly raising the issue. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Heersche, 209 
Kan. 369, 496 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1972) (where trial court awarded 
judgment interest from date of entry of judgment and plaintiffs 
filed no cross-appeal, they were precluded from claiming interest 
for period prior to entry of judgment); Mapston v. Jacobs, 545 
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo. App. 1975) (even if interest were 
improperly computed, award could not be disturbed in absence of 
cross-appeal); National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen, 80 Wash. 2d 
406, 495 P.2d 332 (1972) (interest issue not raised by cross-
appeal was deemed waived). 
Likewise, Mason is precluded on this appeal from 
claiming more interest than the trial court awarded. She may not 
request and receive one amount in the trial court, and then, 
without filing a notice of cross-appeal, seek to modify that 
judgment to claim a larger amount on appeal. Mason has no basis 
-5--
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to raise the claimf and this Court has no jurisdiction to review 
it.2 
POINT II: MASON IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT INTEREST ONLY FROM THE 
DATE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT FOLLOWING REVERSAL AND 
REMAND. 
Mason does not dispute the general rule as cited and 
supported in Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-7, that interest on a 
judgment should run from the date of entry of that judgment. 
Mason simply urges the Court to deviate from that rule in this 
case to allow interest to run from the date of Western's 1982 
judgment instead of from her own 1986 judgment. Mason's 
rationale is that it would be "unfair" to deprive her of interest 
^Even if this Court were to review Mason's prejudgment 
interest claim, it is evident the claim has no merit. Mason 
claims the loss was fixed and calculable with mathematical 
accuracy as of June 1977f the date of the unauthorized 
disbursements. However, it was not clear at that time what 
portion of the disbursements was or was not used in 
construction of the houses. There was simply no accurate 
way of establishing that, as evidenced by the 1982 judgment 
that Mason had proved no loss. Even after this Court's 
decision in Mason I, the amount of loss was unclear. If the 
amount of damages was as clear as Mason suggests, this Court 
would have entered judgment in that amount. Instead the 
Court remanded for calculation of damages under the 
differently allocated burdens of proof. Thus, the extent 
and calculability of the loss, as well as liability for the 
loss, were all uncertain until Mason I and the judgment 
following remand. Therefore, Western engaged in no 
unreasonable delay in satisfying the obligation and no basis 
for prejudgment interest exists. 
-6-
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from entry of the 1982 judgment simply because the judgment was 
not in her favor. But that distorts the entire concept of 
judgment interest. Judgment interest is awarded to the 
prevailing party from the date of entry of the judgment because 
only then is the debt established; only then does the losing 
party owe any money; and only then is the prevailing party 
entitled to enforce the judgment and collect the debt. The 
interest is a penalty to the losing party for nonpayment and 
compensation to the prevailing party for loss of use of the money 
during the period of nonpayment. Seer e.g *, Farnworth v. Jensen, 
117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (1950). Thus, it is unfair to 
charge Western judgment interest for a period of time during 
which it owed no money and Mason had no judgment. Likewise, it 
is unfair to award Mason judgment interest on money that was 
disputed and unliguidated. 
Mason relies primarily on Hewitt v. General Tire and 
Rubber Co, 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712 (1956), but that case is 
not authority for awarding interest on a hypothetical, 
nonexistent judgment. In Hewitt the jury originally rendered a 
verdict for the plaintiff, and the clerk signed and entered 
judgment on the verdict. Three weeks later, the trial court 
improperly set aside the verdict and entered judgment for the 
defendant. This Court reversed and held that judgment interest 
-7-
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should run from the entry of the original judgment for the 
plaintiff because it was a valid judgment. The Court reasoned 
that its mandate "reinstated" the verdict for the plaintiff and 
"vitalized that judgment to the same extent and with the same 
force as though the trial court had never entered the abortive 
and erroneous judgment for defendant." 302 P.2d at 713. Thus, in 
effect, there was never a judgment for the defendant and the 
Court was merely affirming the original judgment for the 
plaintiff. Under those circumstances, Rule 32, U.R.A.P., directs 
that judgment interest run from the date of the original 
judgment. 
By contrast, the 1982 judgment was clearly and 
uneguivocably for Western. Mason had no 1982 verdict or judgment 
to "reinstate" or "vitalize" upon this Court's reversal in Mason 
J^ . Mason had no judgment until after remand in January 1986. 
Therefore, Mason's judgment interest could not possibly run from 
Western's 1982 judgment; it could run only from her own 1986 
judgment. Moreover, this Court in Mason I made no mention of 
awarding Mason judgment interest from 1982. Without this Court's 
express order, the trial court had no authority to deviate from 
the rules regarding judgment interest and award Mason interest 
from the date of Western's 1982 judgment. See, e.g., Rexnord, 
Inc. v. Ferris, 69 Or. App. 146, 684 P.2d 26, 27-28 (1984). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mason's primary non-Utah authority is Isaacson 
Structural Steel Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 640 P.2d 812 (Alas. 
1982). Mason acknowledges the "Stockton Theatres rule," as cited 
in Appellant's Brief, p. 10,3 and then claims that Isaacson 
described the contrary result as the "better rule." (Resp. Brief 
pp. 10-11.) However, that description was offered by the 
claiming party in Isaacson, not by the court. In fact, the court 
readily admitted that the "Stockton approach is the majority rule 
in American jurisdictions," citing cases from several other 
states. JEc[. at 817 n.12. The Alaska court in Isaacson adopted 
the minority rule, allowing interest from the date of the 
original reversed judgment, only because it is more consistent 
with the Alaska view that judgment interest is unrelated to delay 
in payment. Id_. at 818. By contrast, in Utah the entire concept 
of judgment interest is to compensate for delay in payment. See 
Farnworth v. Jensen, supra; see also L & A Drywall, Inc. v. 
Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629-30 (Utah 1980). 
The Texas authority on which Isaacson is based is also 
questionable and distinguishable. The Texas cases allow interest 
from the date of the original reversed judgment only because of a 
^Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal. 2d 439, 
360 P.2d 76 (1961). 
-9-
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peculiar rule of civil procedure under which the court of appeals 
decision replaces the reversed trial judgment as of the date the 
"correct" judgment should have been entered. See American Paper 
Stock Co. v. Howard, 528 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. 1975). Utah has 
no such rule. 
In sum, under Utah law, which is consistent with the 
rule followed in the vast majority of other jurisdictions, Mason 
may receive judgment interest only from the entry of her 1986 
judgment, not from the date of Western's 1982 judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment awarding Mason $6,789.86 in 
judgment interest must be reversed as contrary to Utah law and 
beyond the authority of the mandate in Mason I. 
Dated this }7^-day of December, 1986. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
BY ^ ^ ^ ^j2w^ 
Gregory S. Bell 
David M. Wahlguist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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